This paper is focused on traditional problems and new challenges of justice. Justice is one of these broad categories that can be attributed the quality of universality. Universality of justice is connected, inter alia, with its role in the sphere of morality, although it has its limitations here as well. The categories of justice and responsibility remain closely interconnected and their possible regulatory significance in relation to the relevant areas of human activity is not mutually competitive, but complementary. One of the areas where these links are visible is the area of development in science and technology as well as controlling the consequences of their dissemination. Conflicts related to the development of technology are in general the result of the fact that effects, goals, and assets may have different influence and significance for specific individuals, social groups, but also for society as a whole, or even for humanity. As a result, they will also be assessed differently by these individuals or social groups.
INTRODUCTION
Justice is one of these categories, which have already inspired many a text; nevertheless, it arouses interest of numerous researchers. Its popularity is caused by the multi-faceted nature of problems hidden behind the notion of "justice," which simultaneously results in a multitude of approaches, manners of understanding it, but also a multitude of interpretations, especially in relation to a particular subject matter connected with it. In general, the disputes and discussions that are carried out around and with the application of the category of justice concern:
-the ways in which its particular requirements are understood in relation to the specific content attributed to different interpretations of the principle of justice; -the significance attributed to justice in relation to its pragmatic role as one of the important regulators of individual and collective life.
To a lesser extent, disputes over justice concern the general long-established and recognised ways of understanding it. Therefore, the distinction between distributive and compensatory justice as to how they should be understood in general does not give rise to any notable discussion. In this sense, the general framework of for understanding justice is determined by the suum cuique principle and the principle of proper (equal) measure connected with the principle of formal justice. The former dictates that everyone is to be given what they deserve, and the latter requires this to be done with a proper, i.e. equal, measure (Šimo 2009 p. 56 et seq.) . In this regard, I believe one can agree with H. Šimo, who writes: " [...] there is, therefore, no need to seek new formulations of the most general principles of justice, since suum cuique and the principle of formal justice are sufficient in this respect and, what is more, complementary. Suum cuique, though less strict and more general, is contained in every understanding of justice. Whereas the principle of formal justice -although it does not include marginal understandings of justice -grasps the essence of its typical varieties more accurately than suum cuique. Every case can be reduced to it [...] in which something is considered to due and, above all, it is a formula that accurately expresses the common part of most answers to the question of: what is due?" (p. 60 et seq).
REVIEW
Justice is one of these broad categories that can also be attributed the quality of universality. Universality of justice is connected, inter alia, with its role in the sphere of morality, although it has its limitations here as well. However, these general categories and such a role of justice are not strongly emphasised at present, as the regulatory role of justice may manifest itself better in various specific areas of human activity. Partly in the general sense, but also with regard to various particular areas, some analogies can be observed between the category of "justice" and the category of "responsibility." Both in the case of responsibility and justice, their links with the legal field are clearly visible. The former is somewhat stronger linked, as the legal tradition has imposed a particular understanding of responsibility which also has an impact on how the notion is currently understood. In the case of justice, these links with the law are slightly different as they concern specific conditions relating to particular criteria of justice rather than to its general understanding. Responsibility and justice are relational in nature, and each of them is put into practice in the relevant relations: in the case of responsibility, these are the relations that appear under the questions of "for what" and "to whom," and in the case of justice, these are the relations under the analogous question of "for what," as well as "to whom" and "why." The relational character is connected with another feature, namely the reference to values. This immersion in the world of values gives justice and responsibility a specific axiological character, but at the same time it also gives them generality and universality. It is by reference to values that justice and responsibility take on a concrete character, but also exceed this concreteness and uniqueness, which is not without significance for shaping the human world in the individual and social (cultural) dimension. In this respect, both justice and responsibility can perform regulatory functions. In the case of justice, this may be clearer, as has already been indicated, for example, in the ancient tradition with regard to both the individual (moral) and the social dimension. The issue of social justice still gives rise to various discussions and controversies, all the more so because in this dimension its understanding and implementation are entangled not only in problems and divisions of philosophical significance, but also in legal, political and, more broadly, ideological problems (Šimo 2009 p. 113) . In the case of responsibility, these regulatory functions are not as obvious as in the case of justice. Here, the appropriate, imposed by tradition, ways of understanding responsibility -both individual and for what someone has done -limit these regulatory functions in some way, although the current discussions in this regard are aimed at broadening the understanding of responsibility and its requirements (Kiepas 2000) . The categories of justice and responsibility remain closely interconnected and their possible regulatory significance in relation to the relevant areas of human activity is not mutually competitive, but complementary. One of the areas where these links are visible is the area of development in science and technology as well as controlling the consequences of their dissemination. It is also an area where, so far, more attention has been paid to the issue of responsibility and not justice. -the effects of the development and dissemination of technology -this concerns both, intentionally caused consequences as well as the unintentional and side effects; -the goals that are achieved through the development and dissemination of technology, although these are diverse and not always those achieved are the ones expected by various parties involved in the process; -the tangible and intangible assets, which are specific results of the development of science and technology, and whose distribution in society may, for example, bring benefits to some, but at the same time also losses to others.
These three areas of potential conflict are interlinked. Effects are linked to objectives, although goals may be more subjective in their character, while effects are mostly to be considered as objective. As a consequence, three types of conflicts can be distinguished: conflicts of effects, goals, and assets.
Conflicts related to the development of technology are in general the result of the fact that effects, goals, and assets may have different influence and significance for specific individuals, social groups, but also for society as a whole, or even for humanity. As a result, they will also be assessed differently by these individuals or social groups. The potential for conflict related to the dissemination of scientific and technological discoveries is growing as the range of various consequences of their development increases. On the other hand, it is connected with the fact that the model of development of science and technology, shaped in the modern tradition, was based on their instrumentalization. In modern times, science and technology have been shaped as independent, autonomous, and governed by their own internal rationality, which has consequently resulted in finding appropriate optimum means of achieving the objectives pursued which in fact had hitherto remained outside the field of reflection. Therefore, from this point of view, the problem of control over science and technology shifted from them towards controlling and regulating the motivations and intentions of those who made appropriate decisions and choices concerning their dissemination, or who used them in an appropriate manner. Potential problems and dilemmas appeared in this perspective only along with:
-possibility of abusing certain technologies, i.e.
using them contrary to their intended purpose -an example traditionally mentioned here is of a hammer that can be used for various purposes, which is to confirm the "ethical neutrality" of this tool and the complete dependence of consequences of its application on the intentions of its users; -failure frequency related to their use, e.g. accidents in nuclear power plants -failure frequency is something essentially unpredictable, but at the same time it is a kind of uncertainty which can be defined as residual risk and legitimised as marginal by ignoring it; -the adventitiousness of events resulting from a combination of specific circumstances when the functioning of appropriate technologies coincides with human actions and decisions, e.g. road accidents, here -similarly as in the case of failure frequency -we are dealing with a residual risk situation (Beck 2002 ).
The acceptance of socially generated dangers and threats has been transferred to individuals, thus paving the way for the privatization of dangers to take place. As Z. Bauman writes here: "Hence the information on risks for public use is usually given to lay people in the form of a toolbox for individual use, which leads to the privatisation of risks in general." (Bauman 1996 p. 275) The privatisation of risks was in fact a complementation to instrumentalization, which is characteristic of modern day tradition, and to the autonomy of science and technology, which is associated with it (Beck 2002 pp. 77-78) .
The turn of the 1960s brought about the socalled normative shift in the way science and technology were understood and functioned in society. The change concerned, inter alia, the fact that science and technology were no longer treated as ethically neutral areas, which also had further consequences related to: -a change in the ways in which the consequences of disseminating scientific and technological findings can be controlled -the concept of technology assessment (TA) has become one of the important tools in this respect (Kiepas 2000 p.73 et seq.) ; -the need to accept a risk which can no longer be legitimised by ignoring it, all the more so as the risk ceases to be marginal (residual).
The development of the concept of technology assessment was connected, inter alia, with the socalled crisis of experts and with the discussion on the relation between technology and society that had been taking place for many years. With the increasing number of negative effects of the development of civilisation linked to the dissemination of scientific and technological discoveries, it was necessary to control these effects and introduce appropriate regulations in the field of science and technology.
The crisis of trust in experts has led to a need to strengthen scientific political advisory and, over time, to the participation of laypeople and those directly affected in decision-making processes (Hennen 2004 p. 10 et seq.) . The concept of technology assessment was to play a regulatory role and, as a result of many theoretical discussions and practical tests of its implementation, various models of technology assessment were developed, including the following:
1. decision-making models -the technology assessment was seen here as a kind of early warning system used primarily in the process of political decisions concerning technology; it was perceived as a factor of political advisory and included, inter alia, the following models: the Problems with the implementation of decisionmaking models have led to greater importance being attached in recent years to participatory models. As L. Hennen emphasizes: "When it is impossible to precisely distinguish facts and values, and uncertainties of cognitive nature are not fully resolvable on the grounds of science, and when there is no recognized normative basis for making decisions, there is nothing else to try but to organize the process of technology assessment as an open social process" (2004 p.12) . Alongside this, the idea of linking technology assessment more closely to ethics has emerged (Ropohl 1996) . The methods and models proposed for technology assessment in this respect are at odds with the conflicting nature of the processes we are dealing with here. Actual conflict situations also reveal not only possibilities, but also limitations with regard to the controlling and regulatory role of technology assessment.
THE CONFLICTS RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY
The aforementioned conflicts of effects, goals, and assets are part of the conflicts related to the development of technology. Conflicts of effects, as their description and assessment are not entirely objective, also depend on the various preferences of particular individuals or social groups. Technology can serve different goals and be used for different purposes, and the use of technology can also lead to different effects. On the one hand, the goals that are implemented in the process of dissemination of technology depend on technology itself, but on the other, they also overlap with specific expectations and decisions of people. The effects of the use and dissemination of technology thus remain to some extent independent of the goals, especially those expected, which may vary from one party to another, with the result that conflicts of effects and conflicts of goals are not entirely disconnected. Apart from conflicts related to effects and goals, there are also conflicts of assets. "Conflicts of assets relate to the question of who is to own the good which, as an instrument, leads directly or indirectly to the right goal. It is not so much conflicts that we are dealing with in the case of choice of means, but rather a situation of dissensus. The question of the adequacy of means is linked to the question of the distinction between truth and falsehood, while the choice of goals and assets falls within the scope of what is right and wrong. […] In the situation of sufficient quantity of goods, there is no conflict, whereas in the situation when there is not enough of them, the problem of their proper division arises. [...] Due to practical inequality, equal distribution is only a satisfactory solution to conflicts of assets in a few borderline cases. In general, a discourse about the distribution of goods is sensible when an unequal distribution can be factored in conflict resolution because of a discourse." (Gethmann and Sander 1996 pp.147-148). In addition to the abovementioned conflicts, there are also conflicts of interest and conflicts of division. Conflicts of interest relate to goals and their associated effects, while conflicts of division relate to specific goods and their production and dissemination. The dissemination processes of scientific and technological discoveries also involve the division of effects which, in diverse ways and with different intensity, can affect and burden various social groups and individuals. Finally, there is also a conflict of assessment, as the evaluation of technology includes both an analytical and evaluation parts. Even if the analytical (descriptive) part may be more objective and thus less conflicting, the evaluation part, due to axiological conditions, will by its nature be a source of various conflicts. Consequently, this will also apply to the assessments made during the evaluation process.
To summarize, the conflicts related to technology and its dissemination can be presented in two tables (Kiepas 2012 p. 427): However, the assessment of technology as a tool for resolving conflicts related to the development of technology encounters certain limitations, which also applies to participatory models. It can contribute to increasing knowledge of the effects of technology and thus support decision-making processes. Participatory assessment of technology broadens the group of participants in this process but is not able to eliminate all axiological problems related to the legitimacy of appropriate decisions and choices. It may also involve some risk of confusing the actual with the right. The actual acceptance does not necessarily have to mean the full normative acceptance. The latter should be the basis for the legitimacy of relevant decisions and their consequences, but in practice we are encountering certain axiological difficulties which, in conflict situations, make it difficult or even impossible to find what could be a universal criterion for legitimacy. The participatory assessment of technology presupposes the development of civil society, which must also mean the participation of science and technology in the processes of resolving conflicts related to the development of technology. The conditions for the participation of these two players depend on both science and technology as well as on the society. As A. Grunwald emphasizes: "In order to constitute a socially normative area, there is no fixed way of proceeding or appropriate algorithms. This must be the result of social practice and often of conflict resolution, supported by scientific research and reflection." (2000, p. 294) .
Technology assessment includes various procedures that can be used for conflict resolution. By raising awareness of the effects of technology, decision-making processes and choices made in this respect should have a more rational and rationallygrounded character. However, what remains a challenge when it comes to the technology assessment are the normative problems, which is why the procedures used here are inadequate. In general, procedures for technology assessment must be interlinked with others -political, legal, ethical onesand only along with them can they be a factor in conflict resolution. The development and dissemination of procedures for technology assessment does not automatically lead to conflict resolution but can effectively support these processes. Consequently, the development and dissemination of TA procedures creates potential for conflict resolution, the cognitive potential associated in this case with the dissemination of knowledge about technology and its effects. It is important that those involved in conflict situations and trying to resolve them in some way do so as rationally as possible. On the other hand, however, there are normative problems which are more difficult to solve, and which accompany the processes of development in the field of science and technology and in the dissemination of their discoveries in society. In this respect, a link is needed between ethics and the process of technology assessment. It has also been pointed out, so far, that the principle of responsibility can play a fundamental role here. (Kiepas 2000 p. 100 et seq.) Alongside the principle of responsibility, the principle of justice can also play a role in relation to the normative aspects of conflicts. Its significance can be seen in relation to the conflict of effects and assets, as well as of interests and divisions. In general, this significance can be manifested in two ways, namely:
-procedural one, which refers to the application of the rules, not their content; -normative (axiological) one, directly connected with the content that determines in general what is due and to whom.
The divisions made through the development and dissemination of technology are related to the effects that appear here, which some are burdened with and others are not, and in any case the degree of either inconvenience borne, or potential benefits gained by different entities may not only be different, but also unfair. In this respect, the methods of social assessment of technology associated with its participatory model seem, on the procedural side, to provide greater guarantees of justice than the decision-making models. Admittedly, there is never a full guarantee that, also from the point of view of normative content, the decisions made, and the resultant effects will also be fair, but the degree of these guarantees in the case of decision-making models is even lower. Participatory models involve the participation in the process of making technological choices of various social groups and entities, especially those which may be burdened with specific consequences in the aftermath of these choices. Ensuring the possibility of such participation is a prerequisite for the achievement of procedural justice, but it does not necessarily have to, and will not in practice, lead to dealing only with positive effects and the complete elimination of negative consequences. On the contrary, there is always a situation where there are both positive and negative effects. Both must be accepted by the various parties directly involved as a prerequisite for procedural justice. The question of normative (axiological) aspects of justice is more complex. Decision-making models are always confronted here with dilemmas related to the question of who, why, and on what basis can burden others with specific negative consequences and threats? Participatory models are not free from these dilemmas either, because even if various negative consequences and threats are accepted, there may be problems with the ultimate justification and legitimacy of burdening with them not only others, but also oneself. Nor can the practical application of the principle of procedural justice always be a guarantee of fairness in the results achieved in this respect. However, the implementation of the principles of procedural justice is a prerequisite for the reduction or elimination of "natural" inequalities connected with the situation of various entities involved in the process of social assessment of technology. These inequalities are the result of various positions in the social structure and, therefore, in the processes of making appropriate choices and decisions. The political, legal and even sometimes cognitive knowledge-based advantage of certain entities over others is difficult to overcome in practice. This is more so because we are entering an area of conflict of interest here. These, admittedly, seem to be easier to resolve than conflicts related to goals, because the latter have an axiological basis. In the event of a conflict of interest, it is possible and often easier to reach a consensus than in the event of a conflict of values. In the latter case:
-it is often thought that a consensus is possible only on what threatens us that there is a superiority of a negative over a positive prognosis (Jonas 1995 70 et seq.); -one of the less often taken stances indicating the possibility of reaching a consensus, is the ethics of J. Habermas' discourse; however, neither does it, as a result, escape the accusation of being merely procedural in significance (Kiepas 2000 p. 19 et seq.) .
The dilemmas connected with "natural" inequality is currently also taking on a global dimension, or at least an international one, and are not limited to local conditions. This is illustrated, inter alia, by the example of "upstream/downstream" inequalities, where "upstream" countries are more easily able to escape responsibility as perpetrators of risks and "downstream" countries as recipients of risks have considerable difficulties in enforcing the principle of justice (Beck 2012 pp. 237-238) . One of the proposals that arises in the context of the aforementioned dilemmas is related to the principle of "pragmatic consistency", stating that: "if someone accepts, by choosing a particular form of life, the adequate degree of risk associated with it, then he or she should make this action and the choice associated with it the subject of a discursive debate." (Gethman and Sander 1999 pp. 146-147) This principle is directly linked to the implementation of the principle of procedural justice concerning, in this case, the fair distribution of risks and threats. However, it does not have a purely procedural character, which is expressed in its connection with the demand for "equality" and the demand for "division." The demand for equality states that everyone affected by risk should have equal chances and duties related to participation in the discourse, and the demand for division relates to the necessity of discursive justification of risk distribution (Kiepas 2000 pp. 59-60) .
CONCLUSIONS
Thus, the principle of pragmatic consistency does not merely constitute a purely procedural principle, which is indicated by the specific rules associated with it, namely: a) the Risk Readiness Rule -be prepared to take such a risk, if you have accepted a similar one or demanded it from others, and if you consider it possible to bear it together with them; b) the Opportunity Sharing Rule -act so that those who bear the risk also have a stake in the opportunities as far as possible; c) the Risk-taking Rule -choose risk options so that those who have been least advantaged by the opportunities have relatively the greatest benefits; d) the Precaution Rule -act so that those who bear the risk of your opportunity may receive compensation in the event of being harmed (Gethman and Sander 1999 pp. 148-149) .
The rules clearly establish the principle of pragmatic consistency in axiological problems of distributive and compensatory justice. This creates new challenges for the application of the principles of justice in the dissemination of scientific and technological advances. Responding to them is not easy and it also involves the need to address many of the problems that have already arisen in the discussions on justice. They may not be possible to resolve, but the attempt to do so will certainly enliven discussions about justice and the conditions for its implementation in social processes and for the global dissemination of scientific and technological advances as well as the various uncertainties and risks involved.
